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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 
Court of Appeals No. 920031-CA 
v. i 
JAMES FRANK WILCOX, i Category No. 13 
Defendant-Petitioner. : 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant was charged with one count of unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1991); and one count of unlawful possession of 
a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). He filed a pretrial motion to 
1) suppress the physical evidence on the basis that the affidavit 
supporting the search warrant in his case was insufficient, and 
2) discover the identity of the confidential informant who 
provided grounds for the affidavit. That motion was denied. 
Defendant filed a petition for permission to appeal the 
denial of his motion in the Utah Court of Appeals. That petition 
was denied on March 6, 1992. Petitioner now seeks review by writ 
of certiorari of the court of appeals' denial of permission to 
pursue an interlocutory appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
CERTIORARI HAS NOT BEEN PROPERLY SOUGHT; 
CONSEQUENTLY, IT SHOULD BE DENIED. 
Petitioner titles this petition as a petition for writ 
of certiorari; however, the body of the petition appears to be a 
request for an interlocutory appeal in this Court on issues which 
the Utah Court of Appeals declined to address on interlocutory 
appeal in that court. This petition is devoid of any mention of 
the "character of reasons" which this Court considers in deciding 
whether to grant certiorari. Rule 46, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure (1992). The petition does not ask this Court to 
resolve conflicts between panels of the court of appeals or to 
review a decision of the court of appeals which has departed 
"from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings" or 
to review a decision of the court of appeals on an important 
issue "which has not been, but should be, settled" by this Court. 
Id. Instead, petitioner asks this Court to review a decision of 
the district court which the court of appeals refused to review 
on interlocutory appeal. 
The decision to grant or deny permission to file an 
interlocutory appeal is discretionary with the appellate courts. 
Because petitioner's charges do not involve first degree or 
capital felonies, appellate jurisdiction over his case resides in 
the Utah Court of Appeals. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1992). That court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
petitioner's request for interlocutory appeal. In Manwill v. 
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Ovlei , L I III d fi ,!d 4 .! .1, I h J, IP , .-"il  j 7 7" (1 y h 1 ) , I h i. s Court explained 
the purpose of an interlocutory appeal: 
The purpose to be served j n granting an 
interlocutory appeal is to get directly at 
and dispose of the issues as quickly as 
possible consistent with thoroughness and 
efficiency in the administration of justice. 
But that objective is not always served by 
granting such an appeal. In some instances, 
the necessity of remanding for trial may 
result in protracting rather than shortening 
the litigation. For this reason, whenever it 
appears likely that the matters in dispute 
can be finally disposed of upon a trial; or 
where they may become moot; or where they 
canf without involving any serious 
difficulty, abide determination in the event 
of an appeal after the trial, the desired 
objective is best served by refusing to 
entertain an interlocutory appeal and letting 
the case proceed to trial. Then, if an 
appeal is necessary, there is this additional 
advantage: the issues of facts have been 
determined and the record is viewed in the 
light most favorable to the judgment, instead 
of the reverse. 
Id. .,it; 178, The court: of appeals' deci a i on l" Allow pv1 i t iruei w 
case I;.",1 pfc • *JI achieves the purpose set out in Manwill; 
the issues without serious difficulty, await determination 
on appeal after trial. 
Tli i s i s especially true since the court of appeals has 
resolved these issues adversely petitioner in an opinion filed 
two days after petitioner fi •• petilion Ioi certiorari ** 
the present case. State v. Purser, Case No. 910348-CA (Ui ai * 
App. March . 1992), nearly identical factually to the 
present cas* ion is „:n tached) e 
affi davits and warrants are factually similar and the issues 
raised by Purser (who was represented by i no flier mpinhor «" Scill1 
-3-
Lake Legal Defenders Association and who entered a conditional 
guilty plea before appealing the suppression ruling) are the 
issues raised by petitioner. The court of appeals has addressed 
the issues raised by petitioner and resolved them against 
petitioner's position. 
CONCLUSION 
This petition does not properly present a case for 
issuance of a writ of certiorari; though titled a petition for 
writ of certiorari, the petition is really a request for this 
Court to entertain an interlocutory appeal on a trial court 
decision which the court of appeals declined to review. For the 
foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this 
Court deny the petition for writ of certiorari. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J day of April, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ATTACHMENT 
This opinion is subject to revision before HAR 1 \ 1992 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. * i r 7 ^ 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS **Wy T. Noore** 
CtorkofctheC<a« 
00O00 ttoh Court <* Ap§Mfc 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Jerry Leon Purser, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 910348-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 1 1 , 1992) 
Attorneys: Lynn R. Brown and Ronald S. Fujino, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and J. Kevin Murphy, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Russon. 
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Jerry Leon Purser appeals the trial court's denial of his 
motion to suppress evidence seized under a search warrant. 
Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) and 
58-37-8(1)(b)(i) (1990), reserving the right to appeal the denial 
of his motion to suppress. See State v. Seryf 758 P.2d 935, 939 
(Utah App. 1988). We affirm. 
FACTS 
Narcotics detective Steve Sharp of the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Department requested a search warrant on August 23, 
1990. He submitted an affidavit relating his belief that 
amphetamines, packaging and cutting materials, glassware, drug 
paraphernalia and other chemicals and materials used to 
manufacture a controlled substance would be found on defendant's 
property. 
The affidavit stated Detective Sharp had been contacted by a 
confidential informant (C.I.) who reported defendant was selling 
amphetamines at his residence and described defendant's person, 
car and address. The C.I. stated he had observed illicit drug 
use, glassware, Bunsen burners, a light yellow liquid and 
chemicals inside defendant's residence during the thirty days 
prior to the filing of the affidavit. 
The affidavit further described how the C.I. assisted 
Detective Sharp in performing two drug buys through the use of an 
unwitting participant, within ten days prior to the filing of the 
affidavit. The C.I. picked up the unwitting participant, gave 
the unwitting participant money provided by Detective Sharp and 
received amphetamines from the unwitting participant after the 
unwitting participant entered the defendant's residence. The 
unwitting participant told the C.I. that defendant sold the 
unwitting participant the amphetamines. Detective Sharp searched 
the C.I. for money and drugs before and after the controlled buys 
and both the C.I. and the unwitting participant were observed 
during the buys, except for the time the unwitting participant 
was in defendant's residence. The C.I. received nothing for the 
information or assistance. 
In the affidavit, Detective Sharp described his narcotics 
experience and stated that during the investigation, he observed 
persons enter defendant's residence and leave after only a few 
minutes, which suggested narcotics trafficking. He corroborated 
defendant's identity through personal observation, police and 
driver's license records and a registration check on defendant's 
automobile. Police arrest records showed defendant had been 
arrested for possession of a controlled substance with the intent 
to distribute. 
Detective Sharp requested a no knock, nighttime warrant, 
stating the evidence sought could be hidden or destroyed easily 
and that it would be safer for the officers to use darkness to 
conceal their approach. Detective Sharp based his safety 
concerns on information from the C.I. that defendant had spoken 
of weapons and on Detective Sharp's observation of a sign at 
defendant's house claiming: "This property insured by Smith and 
Wesson•" 
The no knock, nighttime search warrant was issued and 
officers conducted the search at 9:12 p.m. on August 23, 1990. 
The officers seized two to three thousand amphetamine tablets, 
several firearms and ammunition, packaging materials, scales, 
drug paraphernalia, cash, marijuana seeds and other miscellaneous 
items• 
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Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized, claiming 
the search warrant was defective because the supporting affidavit 
did not establish probable cause and did not support the no knock 
or nighttime authorization. Defendant also requested the 
identity of the c.I. to show the C.I* was unreliable and thus 
defeat probable cause. The trial court denied both motions and 
defendant appeals. 
PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT SEARCH WARRANT 
Defendant contends the affidavit supporting the search 
warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause. In 
particular, defendant argues the C.I. was unreliable and the buys 
by the unwitting participant were not reliable, controlled buys 
because the unwitting participant was not searched before and 
after the purchases. 
Before issuing a search warrant, a neutral magistrate must 
review an affidavit containing specific facts sufficient to 
support a finding of probable cause. State v. Babbell. 770 P.2d 
987, 990 (Utah 1989); State v. Dronebura. 781 P.2d 1303, 1304 
(Utah App. 1989). The magistrate must not merely ratify the bare 
conclusions of others. Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 
S. Ct. 2317, 2333 (1983); Babbell. 770 P.2d at 990-91; Dronebura. 
781 P.2d at 1304. The magistrate's task is to decide "whether, 
given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before 
him, including the %veracity' and *basis of knowledge' of persons 
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 
place." Gates. 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S. Ct. at 2332; see Babbell. 
770 P.2d at 991; State v. Weaver. 817 P.2d 830, 832-33 (Utah App. 
1991)• Upon appellate review, we examine the search warrant 
affidavit "in its entirety and in a common-sense fashion," State 
v. Anderson. 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985), deferring to the 
magistrate's decision on whether the search warrant is supported 
by probable cause. Gates. 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S. Ct. at 2331; 
Babbell. 770 P.2d at 991; Weaver. 817 P.2d at 833. 
Factors to consider in determining whether probable cause 
exists include an informant's veracity, reliability and basis of 
knowledge. Gates. 462 U.S. at 233, 103 S. Ct. at 2329; State v. 
Hansen. 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987); State v. Brown. 798 P.2d 
284, 286 (Utah App. 1990). In some cases, the circumstances may 
require the supporting affidavit to set forth in detail the basis 
of knowledge, veracity and reliability of a person supplying 
information in order to establish probable cause. State v. 
Bailey. 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984). In other cases, if the 
circumstances as a whole demonstrate the truthfulness of the 
informant's report, a less strong showing is required. £$!• a t 
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1205-06. For example, reliability and veracity are generally 
assumed when the informant is a citizen who receives nothing from 
the police in exchange for the information. See Bailev, 675 P.2d 
at 1206; Brown, 798 P.2d at 286; State v. Strombera, 783 P.2d 54, 
57-58 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied. 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
Courts have also consistently approved the issuance of search 
warrants where the informant's knowledge is based on personal 
observation. See Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130; Brown. 798 P.2d at 
287; Strombercr, 783 P.2d at 57. Further buttressing reliability 
is the detail with which an informant describes the facts set 
forth in the affidavit and independent corroboration of the 
significant facts by police. See Anderson, 701 P.2d at 1102; 
Bailev, 675 P.2d at 1206; Brown, 798 P.2d at 287. 
In the instant case, the affidavit set forth information 
from the C.I. based on the C.I.'s personal observations, 
satisfying the "basis of knowledge" consideration of the 
totality-of-the-circurostances test. The affidavit did not 
indicate whether the C.I. had been previously reliable. However, 
the circumstances as a whole indicate the C.I.'s information was 
reliable. The C.I. did not receive anything in exchange for the 
information provided, but rather volunteered the information to 
police. In addition, the C.I. described defendant's appearance, 
house, vehicle and the contents of defendant's house with detail 
and Detective Sharp independently corroborated significant facts. 
Detective Sharp checked defendant's address, vehicle registration 
and police^ record, thereby verifying all of the information given 
by the C.I,, except for the items located in defendant's house. 
Detective Sharp also personally observed defendant, defendant's 
house and vehicle, and noticed persons enter defendant's house 
and leave shortly thereafter, which based upon his experience was 
consistent with drug trafficking. "Having personally verified 
all but one piece of information provided by the informant, the 
officer thus had reasonable grounds to believe that the remaining 
piece . . . was also true." Anderson. 701 P.2d at 1102. 
Finally, the C.I. assisted officers in conducting two 
purchases, yielding amphetamines in the form of cross-top pills 
and a white powder, similar to those the C.I. personally observed 
in defendant's residence. Officers searched the C.I. before and 
after each purchase and observed the C.I. throughout. However, 
because the unwitting participant was not searched, defendant 
claims the buys cannot be used to verify the information given by 
the C.I. The purpose of searching a participant before and after 
a controlled purchase is to prevent the participant from 
implicating innocent third persons in order to gain police favor 
or for other personal reasons. Reves v. State. 541 So. 2d 772, 
773 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). Where a person unknowingly 
assists the police, the opportunity and motivation for misconduct 
do not arise. !£. Accordingly, courts have found probable cause 
A 
where the unwitting participant is not searched and disappears 
within the residence for a short period of time. See Delaado v. 
State. 556 So. 2d 514, 516 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Reves. 541 
So. 2d at 773; State v. Hawkins. 278 N.W.2d 750, 751-52 (Minn. 
1979). 
In defendant's case, we need not question the unwitting 
participant's reliability and veracity because the unwitting did 
not knowingly participate in the controlled purchases and acted 
against his/her own penal interest in making the purchase. 
Additionally, officers watched the unwitting participant 
continuously, with the exception of the short time the unwitting 
participant was in defendant's residence. 
Therefore, we conclude, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, that the affidavit established probable cause to 
believe drugs would be found at defendant's residence. 
NO KNOCK, NIGHTTIME SEARCH WARRANT 
Defendant contends the no knock, nighttime warrant was not 
justified because the evidence sought included drug manufacturing 
devices that could not be disposed of easily. Utah Code Ann. 
S 77-23-10 (1990) provides that a no knock warrant is justified 
only upon proof "that the object of the search may be quickly 
destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that physical harm may 
result to any person if notice were given." In addition, the 
warrant must be served in the daytime unless the affidavit 
supports a finding that a nighttime search is necessary "to seize 
the property prior to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged or 
altered, or for other good reason." Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5 
(1990). 
Courts have allowed no knock warrants because of the concern 
for destruction of evidence where "the affidavit suggests that a 
small, readily disposable quantity of drugs in a residence is the 
object of the search." State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730, 733 (Utah 
App.)(amphetamines and marijuana), cert. grantedr 817 P.2d 327 
(Utah 1991); see also State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1367 (Utah 
App.)(marijuana plants), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). 
Where larger quantities of drugs or allegations of drug 
manufacturing are involved, the destruction justification may be 
less persuasive. However, because of the danger involved in 
dealing with those who are engaged in large-scale drug 
manufacturing and distribution, no knock, nighttime warrants are 
justified to allow officers the advantage of surprise, thus 
protecting their safety. See State v. Lien. 265 N.W.2d 833, 839 
(Minn. 1978); State v. Valento. 405 N.W.2d 914, 919-20 (Minn. Ct. 
9iniAR-n% 
App. 1987). Courts have approved nighttime searches, allowing 
officers the cover of darkness, if there are specific facts 
indicating the occupant may be armed or dangerous. See United 
States v, Prvor. 652 F. Supp. 1353, 1364 (D. Me. 1987); People v. 
Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d 480, 749 P.2d 803, 244 Cal. Rptr. 148, cert. 
denied. 488 U.S. 871, 109 S. Ct. 188 (1988). 
In the instant case, the officers were searching for 
amphetamines, in the form of pills and powder; packaging and 
cutting materials; drug paraphernalia; glassware; and other 
materials used to manufacture a controlled substance. Detective 
Sharp observed persons entering defendant#s house and leaving 
after only a few minutes, indicating drug trafficking. The C.I. 
reported that defendant spoke of weapons and Detective Sharp 
observed a sign stating: "This property insured by Smith and 
Wesson.11 Thus, the affidavit set forth evidence of easily 
disposable drugs, talk and signs of weapons and evidence that the 
residence was being used as a drug outlet. The officers were 
searching for evidence that either could be easily hidden or 
destroyed, or that demonstrated possible danger to the officers. 
In addition, officers executed the warrant in the evening at a 
time when previous purchases took place and when defendant was 
likely to be home. Therefore, we conclude based on the facts in 
the affidavit, the no knock, nighttime warrant was justified.1 
1. We distinguish the affidavit in this case from that in Rowe, 
806 P.2d 730. In Rowe. we held that checking a box next to a 
preprinted recital that evidence could easily be disposed of and 
harm to officers could result from notice, by itself, was not 
sufficient to justify a nighttime search. In contrast to Rowe, 
the affidavit in the present case set forth specific facts 
demonstrating the danger to officers and the advantages of a no-
warning search under cover of darkness. In addition, the 
officers searched at 9:12 p.m. in August, as opposed to 11:50 
p.m. in Rowe. not at a time when the occupants of the house would 
likely be asleep and tend to overreact to a forceful entry. 
We have not found any Utah statutes or cases defining 
"nighttime.11 There are generally three views for determining 
what time is "nighttime.ff The first view requires a factual 
determination of whether there is sufficient natural light that 
one can distinguish a person's features. See, e.g.. State v. 
Burnside. 113 Idaho 65, 741 P.2d 352, 356 (1987). The second 
view defines nighttime according to sunrise and sunset. See, 
e.g.. Grant v. Hass. 31 Tex. Civ. App. 688, 75 S.W. 342, 343 
(1903)(daytime is thirty minutes before sunrise to thirty minutes 
after sunset). The last view sets forth specific hours for 
execution of a search warrant without special authorization. 
See, e.g.. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(h) (6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.). We 
(continued.•.) 
£ 
DISCLOSURE OF C.I. AND UNWITTING PARTICIPANT 
Finally, defendant argues that knowing the identities of the 
C.I. and the unwitting participant would have helped his defense; 
therefore, the identities should be disclosed. Defendant did not 
seek disclosure of the unwitting participant's identity in the 
trial court and we will not consider the issue raised for the 
first time on appeal. State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah App. 
1990). As to the C.I., if defendant had been prosecuted for the 
transactions involving the C.I., and disclosure was "essential 
*to assure a fair determination of the issues,'w State v. 
Forshee, 611 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Utah 1980), disclosure would be 
required. However, defendant was not prosecuted based on the 
transactions involving the C.I. Defendant was prosecuted for 
possession with intent to distribute based on the items found 
when the search warrant was executed. Thus the controlled 
purchases in the affidavit were not in issue and were relevant 
only to the question of probable cause to support the search 
warrant. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly stated that "courts will 
not compel disclosure of the identity of an informant, who has 
supplied probable cause for the issuance of a warrant, where 
disclosure is sought merely to aid in attacking probable cause" 
by attacking the reliability of the informant. State v. 
Bankhead. 30 Utah 2d 135, 514 P.2d 800, 802 (1973); accord McCrav 
v. State, 386 U.S. 300, 305, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 1059 (1967); State 
v. Sessions. 583 P.2d 44, 45 (Utah 1978). Therefore, because 
defendant requested disclosure merely to challenge statements 
made in the affidavit supporting the search warrant, we conclude 
the trial court appropriately denied the request. 
In conclusion, we hold there were sufficient facts in the 
affidavit in support of the search warrant to establish probable 
cause and to justify a no knock, nighttime warrant. Furthermore, 
we find no error in the trial court's refusal to disclose the 
1. (...continued) 
do not reach this issue because it was not briefed and we find 
the nighttime search was justified in this case. 
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identity of the C.I. Therefore, we affirm defendant's 
convictions. 
Judith M. Billings, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
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